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Abstract
Hacks are one of the most damaging types of cryptocurrency related
crime, accounting for billions of dollars in stolen funds since 2009. Profes-
sional investigators at Chainalysis have traced these stolen funds from the
initial breach on an exchange to off-ramps, i.e. services where criminals
are able to convert the stolen funds into fiat or other cryptocurrencies. We
analyzed six hack subnetworks of bitcoin transactions known to belong to
two prominent hacking groups. We analyze each hack according to eight
network features, both static and temporal, and successfully classify each
hack to its respective hacking group through our newly proposed method.
We find that the static features, such as node balance, in degree, and
out degree are not as useful in classifying the hacks into hacking groups
as temporal features related to how quickly the criminals cash out. We
validate our operating hypothesis that the key distinction between the
two hacking groups is the acceleration with which the funds exit through
terminal nodes in the subnetworks.
Keywords— Cybercrime, Network Analysis, Hacks, Cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, Cyber-
security, Temporal Networks, Sociotechnical Systems
Introduction
The Bitcoin network is a distributed, public ledger, secured through blockchain tech-
nology. All transactions occur between two distinct public addresses and are perma-
nently recorded on the specific blockchain built for bitcoin. The process of securing
these transactions is handled by bitcoin miners, who use their computing power to
solve complex cryptographic problems and in the process verify blocks and transac-
tions [1].
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Anyone can create a bitcoin address to receive funds through a variety of software
projects such as Blockchain.info [2] or Electrum wallets [4]. Additionally, there is no
limit to the number of bitcoin addresses that any individual or organization can make.
There are also no requirements for verifying your identity in the process of address
creation. It is completely free to make an address, however, it costs money to transfer
money on the network by paying transaction fees.
Because of the ease of transactions between pseudonymous addresses, cryptocur-
rencies, and bitcoin in particular have been especially attractive to criminals who both
exploit technological vulnerabilities and prefer to move funds through the pseudony-
mous bitcoin transaction network to avoid detection by law enforcement [10]. Indeed,
the amount of cybercrime involving cryptocurrencies has grown via ransomware [10],
scamming activity, phishing scams, and hacking of exchanges or wallets [3].
Notably, exchange hacks are one of the most costly types of cryptocurrency related
crime. Hackers have stolen $1.7 billion dollars worth of cryptocurrency from exchanges
since 2011 [3]. Tracing stolen funds in order to freeze the assets of the perpetrators is
one of the most effective ways of safeguarding against future attacks, as this method
removes bad actors from the ecosystem and disincentivizes similar activity from other
actors. Typically, either government or private cyberinvestigators, take up the task of
tracing stolen cryptocurrency funds. Their investigations begin with a known address
that has been hacked. They then follow the funds through up to thousands of different
addresses until the funds hit a service (an off-ramp), i.e. an alternative means of
cashing out the stolen bitcoin. Ideally, an investigator will trace funds to a service so
that a subpoena can be issued to the service to unmask the identity of the criminal.
These investigations result in traced out subnetworks representing the flow of stolen
bitcoin from the point of breech on an exchange through exit ramps. The subnetworks
analyzed here were provided by investigators at Chainalysis, a firm specializing in
blockchain investigations.
We present research to algorithmically visualize and analyze hack cash out subnet-
works that capture the temporal behavior of hackers and locate the stolen funds. We
then build similarity matrices based on eight graph features, run community detection
over those matrices, and successfully classify certain hacks to the known hacking or-
ganization to have carried out the attack. We find that temporal features, such as the
rate at which the hackers send funds to exit ramps, are the most effective features to
use for grouping specific hacks together and classifying them to their hacking groups.
Algorithmically traversing hack subnetworks and its limi-
tations
We investigate bitcoin hacks by traversing subnetworks of nodes that have been built
out by professional crime investigators. These hack subnetworks are comprised of
nodes that have either directly or indirectly received hacked funds.
We then create visualizations to identify trends in the hack and to better under-
stand the time patterns specific to each hack as the stolen bitcoin flows to terminal
nodes, see Figure 8. In some cases, when the level of obfuscation is minimal, investi-
gations tracking stolen funds often terminate at services (see Methodology section on
identifying services), simply because criminals want to change their stolen bitcoin for
fiat currency, or at least convert it to a another cryptocurrency.
Yet cryptocurrency investigations are usually much more complex then this [14].
Often, the investigator may not know if a node belongs to a service, particularly in the
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Figure 1: Sample Hack Subnetwork, Hack A3
case of a mixing service. Furthermore, stolen bitcoin from some of the largest hacks
may utilize laundering mechanisms in which OTC brokers act as third party sellers
allowing for a change of hands to an entity that is no longer behind the hack. This
activity can not be detected through blockchain analytics unless their is a source of
ground truth confirming the funds passing through on OTC broker. Without this con-
firmation, the funds would appear to move from one pseudonymous node to another.
Sometimes the investigations are so complex that the investigator simply cannot go
through the process of tracing every single stolen bitcoin to an cash out point. In this
case, the investigator may choose to chase particularly promising leads, rather then
spend the time to analyze every single transaction that occurred. Additionally, the
actual concept of a terminal node may be less clear. At any given time, stolen funds
may be sitting idly in non-service clusters for extended periods of time. In practice,
it is common for funds to slowly leak out of these “holding” clusters [3]. In this case,
a node is neither clearly a pass through address nor a terminal node.
In all of these cases, using the actual hack subnetwork may be insufficient for
conducting a comprehensive analysis to determine the underlying trends. We therefore
develop the concept of terminal nodes to monitor funds leaking out through both
known exit points, such as identified services, and unknown exit ramps, which are
candidates for terminal nodes.
Because the graphs have such limitations, we develop a parameter, ρ, to define
terminal nodes based on the ratio of sending to receiving activity for a cluster. The ρ
parameter can be set by the investigator as a way to modify the natural edges of the
graph. Continuously varying the ρ parameter from 0% to 100%, and observing the
subsequent changes in the stolen funds flowing to terminal nodes, is also an effective
method upon which we build our pipeline in the following section.
3
Methodology
Pipeline
1. We first gather subnetworks of known hacks that have been built out by profes-
sional investigators.
• Due to the sensitivity of this data and relative infrequency of hack events,
the result of this process provided a small set of anonymized, curated
subnetworks that trace stolen funds from the origin of the hacks to all end
points of interest.
• It is at this point that we introduce a new tool for analyzing these subnet-
works for additional insights that we can eventually return to the investi-
gators and compliance officers at exchanges.
2. We traverse these subnetworks from the starting clusters until the funds have
been fully cashed out at exit points, i.e. terminal nodes.
• An element of complexity emerges in this analysis that requires additional
attention, namely that the terminal nodes require a more rigorous defi-
nition than any cluster sitting on the outskirts of the subnetwork since
many of these terminal nodes act as sinks but still slowly leak funds de-
spite maintaining control over the majority of their hacked balance.
3. Next, to better visualize the temporal activity in the hacks, we create two time
series that display the activity of the hacked funds.
• First, we measure how active the hackers are over time by computing the
number of transfers the hackers make each day, as seen in Figure 6.
• Second, we measure the funds traced as they move to terminal nodes, as
seen in Figure 8. As the funds move through terminal nodes, the share
of funds still held by hackers decreases. A fully tracked hack subnetwork
would be visualized by the funds decreasing from 100% to 0% of funds still
held by the hacker over the number of days that it takes to fully exit the
funds through terminal nodes.
4. We then generate distributions for the following features for each hack subnet-
work:
• Logarithm of Hack balance of all nodes, see Figure 3.
• Weighted In-degree of all nodes, see Figure 4.
• Weighted out-degree of all nodes, see Figure 5.
• Logarithmic difference of the average percent of funds still in play, across
all ρ values, derived from data shown in Figure 8.
• Second difference of the average percent of funds still in play, across all ρ
values, derived from data shown in Figure 8.
• Logarithmic difference of the standard deviation of the percent of funds
still in play, across all ρ values, derived from data shown in Figure 9.
• Average number of transactions to terminal nodes per day, across all ρ
values, derived from data shown in Figure 6.
• Terminal Nodes as a function of ρ, see Figure 7.
4
5. Afterwards, we create similarity matrices corresponding to each distribution,
whose elements are the pairwise similarities of the distributions corresponding
to each of the hack subnetworks via the 1-Dimensional Wasserstein Distance,
i.e. the Earthmover Distance [5][8].
6. We run two community detection algorithms, Modularity Optimization [6][12]
and Walktrap [7][13]. We compare the output of the overall approach across the
similarity matrices for all the distributions against our ground truth attribution
of the two underlying hacking groups and demonstrate the potential for such a
method by properly reattributing the hack networks to their respective groups.
7. Lastly, we review the output communities and test our hypothesis that the
features relating to the hack dynamics are more informative in classifying the
hacking groups than the static network features.
Identifying Services
A typical service can control thousands of addresses, while larger services can even
manage into the millions. We identify services by exploiting features unique to the
Bitcoin blockchain. There are many different approaches that blockchains employ to
cryptographically verify transactions, but the Bitcoin blockchain relies on Unspent
Transaction Outputs (UTXO’s) to record all transactions. A UTXO is the unspent
output of a previous transaction that a user is entitled to transfer to another bitcoin
address. Every wallet that holds a positive bitcoin balance is in possession of at least
one UTXO. When multiple UTXO’s are held by a single user and spent together in
a transaction, it then becomes possible to definitively ascribe common ownership to
all of the UTXO’s that were spent together. This concept of a cospend is the basis
of the clustering activity used by blockchain analysis firms such as Chainalysis to
identify clusters of addresses controlled by a single entity. The network then becomes
comprised of cospend clusters, i.e. nodes, composed of multiple addresses rather than
long chains of single-use addresses [11].
Once addresses have been mapped to a node through cospending activity, the node
can be mapped to a named entity by interacting directly with it. For the example
of an exchange, this process can occur by visiting an exchange’s website, depositing
funds on the exchange, and tracing that transaction via a block explorer [2]. Only
services with publicly available address information can be identified in this way.
When stolen funds arrive at a known service, such as a an exchange, we can assume
that the hackers have attempted to cash out their funds. Professional investigators
trace funds through these nodes to create hack subnetworks that capture as much of
the meaningful movement of the stolen funds as possible.
Defining Terminal Nodes
There are four types of terminal nodes discussed in this paper. 1) A known service
terminal node that is a confirmed service through the process mentioned above of
pairing ground truth knowledge with cospending activity. These services can be ex-
changes, mixers, gambling sites, merchant service platforms, or any exit ramp through
which a criminal can off-load stolen bitcoin to an institutional cryptocurrency player.
2) An unknown service node, where the investigator has reason to believe a node is
behaving like a service and will therefore terminate the investigation at that point, 3)
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a node that the investigator has no reliable information for, or 4) a node in which the
investigation terminates because the investigator decided not to pursue the lead.
By default, terminal nodes are the edges of the graph subnetwork. Ideally, a
subnetwork of a hack would track 100% of the funds from the point of a hack through
all exit ramps. This would allow us to set ρ = 0.00, as the terminal nodes would
simply be all the natural edges of the graph. In this case, the investigator would trace
funds to a service, whether it be an exchange, mixing site, gambling site, etc. ρ = 0.00
indicates that a node has only ever received funds within the subnetwork.
We focus on the ratio rather than the difference of funds sent to received because
we want to maximize the number of meaningful leads for investigators rather than
raw amount due to hacked funds. By returning this normalized list of terminal nodes
and resulting charts, we find all partial sinks “of interest” in the subnetwork that
may facilitate the issuance of subpoenas or other leads, as well as wallets to watch
because they still contain funds, large or small. As a secondary filter, we can sort by
balance due to the hack, but this feature is only relevant in the operational stage for
investigators, not when conducting our analysis.
We define ρ as:
ρ =
weighted in-degree
weighted out-degree
,
i.e. the ratio of the amount of funds sent to received.
Others have proposed using ratios of the in/out degrees when studying the Bitcoin
Transaction Graph, but in different contexts and not as a node-level feature [9].
Figure 2 shows the spectrum of ρ values and their subsequent interpretation.
Figure 2: Spectrum of rho values and their significance
Visualizing temporal behavior in the hack subnetworks
The temporal visualizations are shown in Figures 6 and 8. Figure 6 shows the number
of transfers over time within the hack subnetwork so that the investigator can get a
sense of how active the hackers are over time. They can answer questions such as: does
the hacking group consistently make transactions over time, or do they tend to move
funds according to a temporal pattern. A pattern may be indicative of an algorithm
moving the funds, as opposed to actual individuals approving the transactions.
Figure 8 shows how the funds exit over time through terminal nodes. It allows an
investigator to see the exiting strategy of the hacking group in time. For example, do
the hackers exit the funds in one period of time, or consistently over a longer duration
of time? Each of these strategies has implications for how the investigator profiles the
hacking group overall. For example, a hacking group that exits all the funds through
one exchange in one day may be less organized and less well-funded than a hacking
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group that gradually, through thousands of strategic transactions, exits the funds over
a long period of time.
The trends are made visible by restructuring the hack subnetworks into time series.
Figure 6 demonstrates how active the hackers are by using the number of transactions
they carry out as proxies.
Figure 6 allows us to see the way the hackers utilize terminal nodes. Hacking group
alpha (A1) is much more active, slowly moving funds through terminal nodes over a
shorter period. Hacking group beta (B1) utilizes fewer transactions in general, but
tends to send all of their transfers to terminal nodes in a short period of time. In the
case of chart B1 in Figure 6, the hackers sat on their funds for a long period of time
before abruptly exiting over 70% of the funds through a few exit ramps within a one
week period.
To test the hypothesis that the hackers are best classified using temporal features
such as the rate at which funds cash out at terminal nodes, we vary ρ in the following
sensitivity analysis section to observe stolen bitcoin exiting through terminal nodes
under a range of conditions.
Sensitivity Analysis of ρ
We allowed ρ to range from 0.02 to 0.98 to test the implications of gradually change
the ρ parameter. A cluster with a very low ρ value, e.g. ρ = 0.1, would have to hold
on to more 90% of the funds it received to be considered a terminal node. On the
other hand, a very high ρ value, e.g. ρ = 0.9, allows a cluster to retain only 10% of
the funds it received from the hack in order for it to be considered a terminal node. A
higher ρ will capture many more terminal nodes, as it is an easier condition for nodes
to meet.
A lower ρ value means that the there are fewer terminal nodes picked up in the
graph, and the criteria for being “of interest” to an investigator is extremely high. A
very low ρ specifies that wallets of interested are those which may only hold small
amounts of the total funds that it received. A node holding over 90% of the funds
might be a holding wallet gradually leaking out funds, it might be a consolidation
wallet for a criminal ring, a wallet associated with other types of criminal activity, or
even a point of conversion to another cryptocurrency if, for example, the wallet is an
Exodus wallet, which allows for wallet level cryptocurrency conversions.
Choosing the right value for ρ allows us to optimally grow the hack subnetwork such
that it would include the paths of interest without becoming too large to meaningfully
analyze. We found that setting the ratio too high resulted in a less meaningful yet
larger hack subnetwork, where the terminal nodes did not adequately capture dynamics
of interest, and setting the ratio to be too low did not include clusters that likely should
have been included.
Applying a range of ρ from ρ = 0.02 through ρ = 0.98, in increments of 0.02,
had very large implications for the amount of funds considered to be tracked. While
changing ρ typically revealed how much of the funds the investigator tracked, at the
same time, changing the ρ value does not impact the overall cash out trend witnessed
by the investigator.
These results indicate that varying ρ may not be useful for understanding the
behaviors of the hacker, but is a useful tool for identifying nodes of interest that could
be possible leads to the investigator. Indeed the variance in the ρ parameter proved
one of the most useful tools for running community detection.
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We finally then needed to handle the introduction of funds at a time later than
the hack by either the same or different user. To account for this, we either add these
new flows to the funds at the start and work with the new total as our amount of
hacked funds, or we incorporate these flows into our ρ definition, by stating a further
constraint that if ρ > 1, then it is a terminal node and we do not follow its flows
forward in time. In the case of the former, we can track all funds engaged in clearly
illicit activity, regardless of source, while in the case of the latter, we are actively
restricting the subnetwork to funds that explicitly originated from the source of the
hack.
Feature Definitions
The goal when selecting which distributions to analyze was to capture the behavior
of movement of the hacked funds in a precise way. To confirm the hypothesis that
the two hacking groups exhibit different cashout strategies, we decided to consider the
empirical distributions of 8 different features, as mentioned in Step 4 of the Pipeline.
We define several of the features in our analysis as follows:
1. Hack balance of all nodes.
Bal = log(weighted in-degree − weighted out-degree)
2. Logarithmic first difference of the average, LDA, percent of amounts still in play,
AIP, across all ρ values.
LDA = log(E[AIP(t+1)]
E[AIP(t)] )
3. Second difference of AIP, across all ρ values.
Second Diff(AIP) = LDA(t+1)−LDA(t)
LDA(t)
4. Logarithmic difference of the standard deviation, LDST, of the AIP, across all
ρ values.
LDST = log(E[(AIP(t+1)−E[AIP(t+1)])
2]
E[(AIP(t)−E[AIP(t)])2] )
5. Average number of transactions to terminal nodes, TTN per day, across all ρ
values.
Transactions = E[TTN ]
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Similarity Matrices
Once all of the normalized histograms were generated, we measure the pair-wise simi-
larity between them, per variable, via the 1-Dimensional Wasserstein Distance, a.k.a.
the Earthmover Distance or L1 Norm. Generally, the Lp Norm is defined as:
Wp(F,G) = (
∫ 1
0
|F−1(u)−G−1(u)|p du)1/p,
where F and G are empirical distribution functions with generalized inverses, F−1 and
G−1 [8].
Community Detection
After the similarity matrices are computed for the distributions of interest, the goal
becomes differentiating between the two hacking groups. We propose a method of
representing the similarity matrices as networks and searching for two distinct com-
munities via both Modularity Optimization and Walktrap and comparing the results.
Modularity Optimization [12] consists of finding a near maximal value for Mod-
ularity, Q, returned from the communities applied to some null model of network
formation, typically a Random Network.
Q = 1
2m
∑
vw
[[Avw − kvkw2m ]δ(cv, cw)],
where m is the number of edges in the network, Avw is 1 when nodes v and w are
connected and 0 otherwise, kv is the sum of Avw over w, and δ(i, j) is 1 when i and j
are equal and 0 otherwise.
Walktrap [13] operates similarly, also attempting to optimize the same modularity, but
with a focus on short random walks exiting communities as the explicit motivation
and approach.
Both algorithms are built for analyzing large networks, and their true modularity
optimization functions are not explicitly the Q written above, but a derived form.
We utilized both methods as independent confirmation rather than any benefits
from their relative optimizations. As the resulting networks are small, with one node
corresponding to each hack, are eight distributions analyzed, and two applications of
community detection, any conclusions drawn from our method are only tentative since
no conclusive results can be drawn from such small amounts of data. Nevertheless, we
propose the full method as technically sound and a novel tool in the analysis of hack
subnetworks in the bitcoin blockchain.
Results
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Figure 3: Distribution of Log Balance
Figure 4: Distribution of In Degree
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Figure 5: Distribution of Out Degree
Figure 6: Transactions over Time
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Figure 7: Number of Terminal Nodes as function of ρ, TvR
Figure 8: Amount in Play over Time
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Figure 9: Standard Deviation of Amount in Play over Time
Figure 10: Similarity Matrices of Feature Distributions for Hacking Groups A
and B
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Each Hack
Hack Txs Nodes Avg In Deg Avg Out Deg Clust. Coeff
A1 1,981 1,257 1.02 1.02 0.001
A2 421 55 1.11 1.11 0.041
A3 607 218 1.05 1.05 0.008
B1 190 176 1.01 1.01 0.000
B2 374 335 1.06 1.06 0.002
B3 57,299 174 1.62 1.62 0.068
Figure 11: Communities for all features’ similarity matrices - First by Walktrap
then Modularity Optimization
As discussed in the Methodology, the communities shown in Figure 11 correspond
to those identified by two clustering algorithms with the first two rows being Walktrap’s
output communities on each distribution’s similarity network, and the second two
rows being the results obtained via Modality Optimization. As can be seen, similarity
matrices derived from different distribution comparisons, whether analyzed by the
same or different algorithm lead to different observed communities. Though they
are often different, the communities do share some common characteristics with each
other. For example, for all but the clustering of Balance similarity and TvR, nodes
{B1, B2, B3} are always clustered together. Furthermore, 9 out of the 16 clusters have
at least two members of group A together.
To better quantify consensus among the results in 11, we first find one node N
which remains in the same group through all of the methods (we chose node B6)
so as to establish a common group naming (in other words, it is no longer the case
that a node is either in the blue or the red group seen in Figure 11, rather that each
node is either in the same group as our fixed node or in the opposite group), and
then we generate a number ni,j associated to each node i and community j, with
j ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., 16}, setting ni,j = 1 if i is in the same group as N and ni,j = 0
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otherwise. We then compute the probability of node i being in the same group as N
with p =
∑16
j=1
ni,j
16
. Finally we bisect the vector of values to along its median and
obtain the grouping {A1, A2, A3}, {B1, B2, B3}.
This process was repeated using two feature set combinations. The first set con-
tained all 8 features, and its resulting vector was (0.625, 0.5, 0.1875, 0.8125, 1, 1).
The second set included only temporal features, namely: LDA, Second Diff(AIP),
LDST, and ATVR and had a resulting vector of (0.25, 0.5, 0, 1, 1, 1). Note, that
the ground-truth vector is simply (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1). In both cases, the bisection works
to successfully find the two communities. In the case of only temporal features, the
results are even more compelling where 0.5 can be used to bisect the set of hacks into
their respective communities.
Discussion
We ran this analysis on historical hacks curated by Chainalysis investigators. The 6
hacks analyzed were carried out by 2 distinct and well-known hacking groups. Due
to ongoing investigations, the names of the hacking groups cannot be revealed at this
time.
Analyzing the subnetworks using our proposed methodology allowed investigators
to observe the cash out methods for the different hacking groups. Analyzing each
subnetwork based on features above allowed for greater understanding of each specific
hack and hacking group, as well as the ability to successfully classify hackers via our
pipeline.
Hacking Group Alpha
We analyzed three distinct hacks carried out by hacking group alpha. Hacking group
alpha is a large, well-funded organization. The hacks analyzed in this paper reveal
that the subnetworks tracing funds stolen by hacking group alpha are highly complex,
with the stolen funds moving through many nodes. The stolen bitcoins are slowly
cashed out through terminal nodes overtime. Investigators confirmed this trend.
Funds flowing to terminal nodes from the three hacks visualized in Figure 8 further
confirm this trend. Stolen bitcoin being moved by hacking group alpha appear to
slowly leak out of possession of the hackers through terminal nodes. Taking both the
first and second differences for the amount in play visualized in Figure 8 demonstrates
that the acceleration at which stolen funds exit through terminal nodes is a significant
means of clustering the graphs. Just taking first differences successfully clusters hack
A3 and hack A1 together. Visually, A1 and A3 are more similar. Looking at the
second differences, i.e. the acceleration, for the amount in play visualized in Figure
8 is most successful at finding communities of hacks. Running community detection
on the similarity matrices for the second differences of the amount in play successfully
identifies that A1, A2, and A3 belong in the same community.
The number of transfers that the hackers use to move the funds has also proven
significant for helping to effectively classify the hacks according to their hacking groups.
As shown in Figure 6, hack A2 and A3 appear to have similar trends in terms of the
number of transfers made each day following the hack. The community detection that
we ran on the hacks classified these two hacks together when looking only at trends
in the frequency of transactions sent to terminal nodes.
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Analysing the variance in the ρ parameter, as visualized by Figure 9 captures how
the share of funds exiting through terminal nodes changes as ρ approaches 1. The
standard deviation for the ρ parameter as ρ approaches 1 approximates the variety in
behavior for terminal nodes. Using the log difference in standard deviation across the
amount in play by varying ρ allows us to classify hacks A3 and A1 together. Both
these hacks had similar changes in the amount in play for each ρ over time, whereas
A2 had some uncharacteristic behavior for hacking group alpha around day 250. A2
was a much smaller sized subnetwork, with only 55 nodes, than A1 and A3, with 1257
and 218 respectively. This made the standard deviation of the amount exiting through
terminal node more sensitive as ρ increased.
We investigated whether the distribution of balances across all the nodes in the
hack would be a useful indicator to help classify hacks. This was one of the weakest
features used to classify the hacks into hacking groups. As shown in 3 there is a
wide variety in the distribution across all the nodes in the graph based on their hack
balances. Hack A3’s distribution, for example, had a higher peak, meaning many of
the hacks in A3 held a similar balance. Yet A2 had much more variety across the nodes
within the graph in terms of how much stolen bitcoins each node ended up holding.
Using the distribution of the log balance by nodes was not useful on its own to help
classify hacks, and caused one of the few instances of mistakenly grouping hacks A3
and B4 together as seen in Figure 11.
Hacking Group Beta
We then analyzed three hacks carried out by the second hacking organization referred
to here as hacking group beta. When visualizing the hack subnetworks for hacking
group beta, there are striking differences in the cash out mechanisms. Hacking group
beta tends to send a majority of its funds through terminal nodes over a short period
of time. They tend to sit on their funds quietly, sometimes moving some funds through
wallets of interest, but have a characteristically abrupt cash out pattern.
This pattern is visualized in Figure 8, where hacks B1, B2 and B3 all have notable
vertical drops, representing abrupt moments of cashing out through terminal nodes.
Running our community detection algorithms on the first differences of this activity
successfully classified all B hacks as belonging together, see Figure 11, yet also iden-
tified hack A2 as fitting a similar pattern. The second differences for the amount in
play chart is the best at predicting the proper community assignment. Its top perfor-
mance can be attributed to its correctly capturing the acceleration of the funds exiting
through terminal nodes, which confirms the hypothesis put forward by investigators
about temporal trends in exiting funds.
All of the hacks from hacking group beta have a large variance for ρ as ρ approaches
one, which can also be visualized in 8. This signifies a large range in sending versus
receiving behavior for the nodes within the hacking group beta hacks. Funds are
exiting through a wide variety of nodes, and not simply hitting one exit point which
only ever received funds.
Looking at the distribution of balances held by the nodes within the subnetwork
demonstrates the variety of node behaviors present. However, this was again a weak
feature when it came to classifying the hacks through community detection. Hack B1
had many nodes that passed through mixing services which were unclustered in the
subnetwork. The mixers would siphon off parts of the stolen funds into consolidator
wallets in similar patterns. The investigator only tracked the fattest paths, leaving
many of the known nodes passing through mixers with a similar balance. Using balance
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distribution when the graph is not fully built out was shown not to be useful for
community detection.
We next looked at the variation in the AIP over all ρ as visualized in Figure 9. The
shape of this graph visualizes how ρ affects the share of funds exiting through terminal
nodes. Almost all of hack B1’s funds exit through a wide variety of terminal nodes on
the first day. The standard deviation peaks at this point, followed by a long period of
no fund movements. We successfully classified hacks B1, B2, and B3 together using
our community detection algorithms, but hack A2 was mistakenly grouped in when
using this feature, as shown in Figure 11.
We then analyzed the number of transactions going to terminal nodes in Figure 6.
The number of transactions showed no clear visible pattern to help classify the hacks
into hacking groups. While the community detection algorithms successfully classified
all three hacks from hacking group beta together, it also picked up hack A1.
Key Takeaways
We began this analysis by talking with Chainalysis investigators about what they
knew about the hacking groups. They indicated that the key differentiation between
the two groups, is the pattern by which they hold funds and the subsequent rate at
which they cash them out. Our analysis confirms this hypothesis.
We conclude that static features of the charts, such as balance distributions, in
degrees, and out degrees are not useful features for classifying the hacks into hacking
groups. There are many limitations to these static features. To start, they likely
require a fully built out, comprehensive graph. Many of the graphs we chose to analyze
were incomplete from the start. This means the takeaways from the static features of
the charts were also fundamentally incomplete.
More importantly, our hypothesis of focusing on the temporal features of the sub-
networks, rather than the static features was validated. The results indicate that the
patterns by which the subnetworks evolve over time serve as useful features for optimal
classification based on the method described in this paper. The optimal classifications
in Figure 11, specifically the second difference - or acceleration - of AIP, are most
characteristic of the subnetworks temporal nature. Varying ρ to alter our level of res-
olution into terminal nodes also plays a role in the usefulness of our temporal features
and the resulting classifications. The correct classifications were obtained when simi-
larity matrices were built from these temporal features and the community detection
algorithms was subsequently run to differentiate the hacking groups based on these
features exclusively.
Conclusion
Hacks represent an important challenge for law enforcement, the Bitcoin community,
and financial institutions. There is opportunity for an algorithmically informed ap-
proach to analysis of existing hacks as well as real time monitoring of hacks. This
research represents an attempt at building a more rigorous framework for such an
approach via an analysis of both the static and temporal features of hack subnetworks
and suggests that the temporal features represent an important avenue of exploration
for a deeper understanding of the hack subnetworks.
17
Future Work
Due to the small sample size, and the sensitive nature of the underlying data, the tools
we develop are currently useful for visualization and description rather than conclusive
statistical analysis of existing hacks. We aim to continue gathering data and expand
our analysis.
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